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Introduction 
 
China is a geographically challenged state, with numerous neighbors on land and 
at sea.  As Samuel Kim once noted, China is a “G-1,” a country without real or natural 
allies.1  Although it has security relationships with Pakistan and North Korea, these 
countries, on balance, are liabilities and do little to enhance China’s security.  As a result, 
China’s relationships with neighboring states, especially those adjacent to its land and sea 
borders, have played a central role in China’s foreign policy during the Mao era and after.  
When relations with these states have been poor, China has been more prone to 
encirclement, as great powers can gain additional sources of leverage over China by 
improving ties with China’s neighbors.  By contrast, when relations with these states 
have been good, China has increased its autonomy, which limits the ability other great 
powers to constrain China’s behavior and allows China to concentrate on domestic issues 
such as economic growth. 
One central feature of China’s diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has been 
the steady engagement of its neighbors, improving ties with almost all these states.  
Under the rubric of “omni-directional diplomacy,” China normalized ties with estranged 
neighbors, engaged newly independent states, and improved ties with major states like 
India and Japan.  Such diplomatic success was achieved despite the presence of 
contentious issues between China and many of its neighbors, especially over disputed 
territory.  In some cases, the resolution of territorial disputes has created a foundation for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Samuel S. Kim, "China and the World: In Search of a Peace and Development Line," in Samuel S. Kim, 
ed., China and the World, (Boulder: Westview, 1989), p. 148. 
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improved ties.2  In other cases, the significance of these disputes has been downplayed to 
allow for the development of deeper political and economic relations.3 
Today, however, China’s successful engagement of its periphery has begun to 
unravel as China has affirmed and asserted its claims in maritime disputes in the East and 
South China Seas.  These actions have revealed the limits of China’s “good neighborly 
policy” of the 1990s and most of the 2000s.  As a stronger China seeks to defend what it 
views as its territorial and maritime interests, it threatens the security of its neighbors, 
who grow increasingly wary of China’s long-term intentions.  As a result, China’s 
neighbors are balancing against Beijing, externally by improving ties with the United 
States and other major powers in the region and internally by strengthening their own 
military and especially naval capabilities.  In turn, the influence of the United States in 
the region has grown, creating (from China’s perspective) the specter of balancing 
coalitions, at least in the security realm. 
China has responded in several different ways to this new situation.  To repairs 
ties with its neighbors and improve its position in the region, China has pursued periods 
of moderation in its maritime disputes, worked to immunize broader bilateral relations 
with neighbors from these disputes, and has moved to improve ties with the United States 
to decrease Washington’s role in these disputes.  Nevertheless, none of the responses 
appear to be working because they fail to address concerns about Chinese intentions that 
these disputes generate – concerns exacerbated by perceptions of growth Chinese power, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 M. Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in 
Territorial Disputes," International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 46-83. 
3 This is the story of China’s ties with India.  See M. Taylor Fravel, "China Views India’s Rise: Deepening 
Cooperation, Managing Differences," in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner and Jessica  Keough, eds., 
Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers -- China and India, (Seattle: National Bureau 
of Asian Research, 2011), pp. 65-98. 
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especially its military capabilities. 
This chapter will proceed as follows.  The first section will review the importance 
of China’s periphery in Chinese grand strategy and foreign policy.  The second section 
examines how China’s defense of its maritime claims have harmed ties with many of its 
East Asian neighbors, who are now taking actions to enhance their ability to resist China 
in these disputes, by both strengthening ties with the United States and by investing in 
greater military capabilities.   The third section discusses how China has sought to 
respond to the worsening of ties with its maritime neighbors in the region. 
 
 
The Centrality of Regional Diplomacy 
 
Among great powers, past and present, China enjoys a uniquely complex regional 
security environment.  China has fourteen neighbors on land and eight at sea.  China’s 
land border runs more than 22,000 kilometers, while its coastline extends approximately 
14,500 kilometers.  The sheer number of neighbors, in culturally distinctive sub-regions, 
would pose a daunting diplomatic challenge for any country.  But China’s situation is 
even more complicated, given the characteristics of its periphery: Four neighbors — 
Russia, India, Pakistan and North Korea — possess nuclear weapons, while others such 
as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan could easily develop the bomb if they chose to do so.  
Some of China’s neighbors could be described as potential failed states characterized by 
great uncertainty about their own domestic political stability, including North Korea and 
Afghanistan as well as other states in Central Asia.  Two neighbors, India and Russia, 
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possess two of the largest ground forces in the world in addition to nuclear weapons.  
Others, including Japan and India, field modern and capable navies.  Finally, the United 
States maintains formal alliances with five states in the region, including three of China’s 
maritime neighbors (South Korea, Japan and the Philippines).  Through these alliances, 
the United States maintains a substantial military presence in East Asia, including 180 
ships and approximately 2,500 aircraft part of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).4 
As a result, managing ties with its immediate neighbors play a central role in 
China’s foreign policy.  As a group and individually, these states can harm Chinese 
interests.  First, the large number of neighbors on land and at sea means that China can 
easily face conflicts or challenges to its interests simultaneously along different vectors or 
what Chinese strategists describe as “strategic directions” (zhanlue fangxiang).5  As a 
result, China can face strategic pressure in different areas and, historically, has feared 
being encircled and contained by other powers.6  Second, the large number of neighbors 
suggests that China has to work even harder than other great powers to maximize its 
autonomy and freedom of maneuver in its own backyards. China’s geographic 
circumstances can facilitate the formation of balancing coalitions that can coalesce to 
limit Chinese autonomy and freedom of maneuver in the region.  China’s neighbors also 
serve as sources of influence or leverage over China that powers from outside the region 
(or stronger powers within the region) can exploit to limit China’s autonomy.  They can 
do this directly, by using China’s neighbors as bases for forward-deployed troops, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “USPACOM Facts,” http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/facts.shtml.  Pacific Command accounts for 
approximately 20 percent of U.S. armed forces. 
5 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., Zhanlue xue [The Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Junshi 
kexue chubanshe, 2001). 
6 Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future  
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2000). 
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indirectly, by supporting these countries in their own conflicts with China.  Third, with 
many neighbors, many more opportunities for conflict exist on China’s periphery than for 
most other great powers.  As result, China can be more easily dragged into regional 
entanglements that divert its national resources from other priorities, especially economic 
development. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, maintaining good ties with its immediate neighbors 
advances important Chinese interests.  The first is the prevention of encirclement by 
potentially hostile states, including preventing the formation of coalitions that can form to 
balance Chinese power.  The second is maximizing strategic autonomy and freedom of 
maneuver, both with its immediate neighbors and with great powers that might otherwise 
try to use their own ties with China’s neighbors to constraint China.  Third, good ties with 
neighboring states are a prerequisite for maintaining a “peaceful and stable external 
environment” and the absence of armed conflict on China’s borders within which to 
pursue economic growth.  Conflicts along China’s borders can not only increase the 
presence and thus potential influence of other great powers, creating a strategic challenge, 
but may also directly involve China. 
Although maintaining good ties with neighboring states played a role in China’s 
“Bandung” era foreign policy in the 1950s, they have become even more important after 
the demonstrations and massacre in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.  Since then, China 
has pursued an “omni-directional diplomacy” (quanfangwei waijiao) premised on 
maintaining good relations with the largest number of states, both to compensate for its 
lack of natural allies and to hedge against America’s dominant position in the 
 	   6 
international system.7   
China’s post-Tiananmen engagement of the Asian region began with the rapid 
normalization of diplomatic relations with the neighboring and other regional states.  
Between 1989 and 1992, China established diplomatic relations or normalized ties with 
Laos, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia and Singapore. China also quickly established 
formal diplomatic relations with all the successor states of the collapsed Soviet Union on 
its land border (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan).  As a part of this 
process, China resolved outstanding territorial disputes with Russia, Laos, Vietnam, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and entered into military confidence-building 
measures with India and the Soviet successor states in Central Asia.8 
A rise in tensions over the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea in the 
early to mid-1990s, however, limited the pace of China’s regional engagement after 
Tiananmen.  Along with the rapid growth of China’s economy toward the end of the 
1990s, fears arose among China’s smaller neighbors and other states in the region about 
China’s ambitions.9  China addressed these concerns in several ways.  First, it moderated 
its approach to the Spratly Islands and ultimately signed a code of conduct declaration 
with ASEAN in 2002.10  Second, it turned to multilateral institutions to re-assure states in 
the region about China’s intentions.  This process started with a deepening of China’s 
substantive engagement with ASEAN, culminating in the establishment of a number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Zhang Baijia, "Cong 'yi bian dao' dao 'quan fang wei': dui 50 nianlai zhongguo waijiao geju yanjin de 
sikao  [From 'Lean to One Side' to 'Omnidirection': Reflections on the Evolution of China's Foreign Policy 
Structure over the Past 50 Years]," Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, No. 1 (2000), pp. 21-28. 
8 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial 
Disputes  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
9 Michael A. Glosny, "Heading toward a Win–Win Future? Recent Developments in China’s Policy toward 
Southeast Asia," Asian Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2006), pp. 24-57. 
10 Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Vol. 25, No. 3 (December 2003), pp. 343-362. 
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formal dialogue mechanisms in the late 1990s and a free-trade agreement in 2002.11  
China also played a leading role in the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, a grouping focused on Central Asia that now includes six members, five 
observer states, and three dialogue partners.  Third, China increased its economic 
interactions with these states and sometimes signed attractive free-trade agreements to 
demonstrate how China’s rise would benefit the region as a whole economically.12  
Fourth, China has actively pursued strategic partnerships with states in the region, 
especially the most powerful ones including Russia, India and Japan.13 
China developed several slogans to underpin this diplomatic engagement of its 
neighbors.  Overall, it has been described as the “good neighbor policy” (mulin zhengce).  
The goals have been described as “becoming friends and partners with neighbors” 
(yulinweishan, yilinweiban) and building an “amicable, tranquil, and prosperous 
neighborhood” (mulin, anlin, fulin).  By the middle of the 2000s, China’s ties with most 
of its neighbors were viewed as an unparalleled success.  Economic and political ties 
deepened while contentious disputes over territory were either resolved or sidelined.  
Many observers trumpeted China’s “charm offensive” and the rise of China’s “soft 
power.”14  All of this occurred under the rubric of “peaceful rise” and “peaceful 
development” or the claim that China’s rise could be different than past great powers. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Glosny, "Heading toward a Win–Win Future?" 
12 Glosny, “Heading toward a Win-Win Future?” 
13 Evan S. Medeiros, China's International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification  (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). 
14 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World  (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2007). 
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Maritime Disputes and the End of Good Neighborliness 
 
China’s “win-win” approach toward its neighbors, however, has begun to unravel.  
In East Asia, China’s ties with many (but not all) of its neighbors have deteriorated since 
roughly 2008.  The proximate cause has been China’s assertion of its territorial claims, 
which brings it into direct conflict with its neighbors.  The structural cause has been the 
continued growth of the Chinese economy and continued success of China’s military 
modernization efforts, which casts a long shadow over China’s actions in its territorial 
disputes.  As a result, China’s neighbors have sought to improve ties with the United 
States, creating a powerful rationale for Washington to remain engaged and enmeshed in 
the region. 
The deterioration of China’s ties with many neighbors was not the product of a 
new policy or strategy toward the region.  Instead, it has occurred because a stronger and 
more capable China has acted to defend what it believed to be important or vital interests 
being challenged by other states.  The dynamics of the security dilemma illuminates why 
China’s “good neighbor policy” has begun to unravel.  According to this concept, the 
dilemma exists because one state’s efforts to increase its own security usually decrease 
the security of other states.15 Given the uncertainty created by anarchy in the international 
system, even if one state enhances its military power for what that country sees as 
defensive reasons, other states are likely to view the same actions as offensive and 
threatening, resulting in security competition characterized by mistrust, suspicion, and 
spirals of tension.  In this view, security is zero-sum, where one side’s gain can only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), 
pp. 167-214. 
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come at the expense of another.  Such spirals are especially likely when a state increases 
its defense spending significantly and acquires force projection capabilities, two features 
of China’s current military modernization effort.16   
The dynamics of the security dilemma are especially pernicious in territorial 
disputes, which are zero-sum conflicts over the ownership of land or exclusive 
jurisdiction over maritime space.  Territorial disputes by definition are unstable and prone 
to negative spirals of instability associated with the security dilemma.  States in such 
disputes are especially sensitive to perceived challenges to their claims by other states.  
Any action by one state to strengthen its own claim creates strong incentives for other 
states to respond.  Such incentives are especially powerful because of the public nature of 
claims in territorial disputes and because international law requires states to actively 
assert and defend their claims.17 
As territorial disputes escalate, states that feel threatened will act to protect their 
interests.  Most states in disputes with China have adopted different types of balancing 
responses designed to check or counter China’s growing capabilities.  As described by 
Kenneth Waltz, a state can undertake internal balancing measures to increase its own 
capabilities, especially its military capabilities.18  In addition, a state can seek to 
aggregate its capabilities with other states facing a similar threat.  Historically, such 
external balancing has involved formation of alliances, but can also include the 
strengthening of existing alliances and the establishment of other types of security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a recent review of China’s growing capabilities, see, Michael D. Swaine, et al., China’s Military and 
the U.S.-Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment  (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2013). 
17 On the security dilemma in territorial disputes, see Thomas J. Christensen, "The Contemporary Security 
Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), pp. 7-
21; Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes. 
18 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics  (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
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cooperation. 
 
The South China Sea 
 
In the South China Sea, China’s pursuit and defense of its maritime claims has 
worsened ties with many states in Southeast Asia.  China’s behavior has created 
opportunities for the United States to deepen its ties with states in the region and sparked 
efforts by regional states to strengthen their own naval capabilities.  Japan and India have 
likewise become more engaged in Southeast Asia, expressing support in various forms 
and ways for states opposing China in the South China Sea.   
 
Background 
 
Conflict in the South China Sea revolves around competing claims to territorial 
sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction.  Claims over maritime jurisdiction include not just 
the scope of claims but also their content, including the navigation rights of military 
vessels.   
In the South China Sea, the territorial sovereignty of two groups of islands and 
reefs is contested.  The first is the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by China and 
Vietnam (along with Taiwan).  China has controlled the Amphitrite Group since the mid-
1950s and consolidated control over the entire archipelago after a brief clash with South 
Vietnam over the Crescent Group in 1974.19   The second is the Spratly Islands, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Strategy in the South China Sea," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 
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consists of roughly 230 features, including several small islands, coral reefs, and shoals.  
Vietnam, China, and Taiwan claim sovereignty over all these land features.  The 
Philippines claims fifty-three of these features, while Malaysia claims twelve.  All of the 
claimant states occupy some of the islands and features that they claim.20 
Claims to maritime jurisdiction involve exclusive rights to water space.  In 
particular, they involve whether states have the exclusive right to exploit resources that 
are contained in the water column or seabed with a 200 nautical mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) or an extended continental shelf.  Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Brunei, base their claims to maritime rights in the South China Sea from 
their coasts.  Indonesia asserts maritime rights from Natuna Island.  China, however, 
bases its claims to maritime rights on sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys.  Yet 
most (but not all) of the features in the Spratlys would not qualify as islands under article 
121(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and thus 
cannot serve as the basis for a claim to an EEZ, much less an extended continental shelf.  
In addition, ambiguity surrounds China’s claims to maritime jurisdiction for other 
reasons.  For many decades, Chinese maps have shown a “nine-dashed line” enclosing 
most of the waters in the region. Yet the Chinese government has never defined what the 
line does — or does not — mean.21  Commentary by Chinese scholars and analysts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 (December 2011), pp. 292-319. 
20 Vietnam occupies twenty-seven of the land features in the Spratlys, more than all the other claimants 
combined.  The Philippines occupies eight features, China seven, Malaysia five, and Taiwan one.  Taiwan 
was the first claimant to occupy a contested feature, when Nationalist troops in 1956 landed on Taiping (Itu 
Aba) Island, the largest of the islands.  See M. Taylor Fravel, "Maritime Security in the South China Sea 
and Competition over Maritime Rights," in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., Cooperation from Strength: The United 
States, China and the South China Sea, (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2012), pp. 
34-35. 
21 Fravel, "Maritime Security in the South China Sea and Competition over Maritime Rights; Fravel, 
"China's Strategy in the South China Sea." 
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suggest that may seek to claim some sort of historic rights to the resources contained 
within the line.22 
 
Growing Tensions 
 
In the South China Sea, tensions in maritime disputes between China and other 
claimants, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, have increased substantially in the 
past few years.  One key turning point was a deadline set by a UN body tasked with 
assessing claims to extended continental shelves.  Diplomatic tensions over maritime 
rights increased in the weeks before the May 2009 deadline for submissions to the U.N. 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).23  If a territorial or maritime 
dispute exists, however, then the commission’s rules dictate that it “shall not consider and 
qualify a submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute.”24  As a result, 
all claimants in the South China Sea had strong incentives to challenge the continental 
shelf submissions where sovereignty or maritime rights claims overlapped.  Accordingly, 
China and the Philippines both objected to Vietnam’s submission and to the joint 
Vietnamese-Malaysian submission.  All the claimants then issued claims and counter-
claims.25  
Even though the May 2009 deadline for submissions had been established ten 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, “The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and 
Implications,” The American Journal of International Law 
Vol. 107, No. 1 (January 2013), pp. 98-124 
23 Under the treaty, a state can only exercise rights to the continental shelf if the CLCS certifies the claim. 
24 Rules of Procedure of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (New York: United Nations, 
2008), 22. 
25 A list of all submissions and objections is available on the commission’s website: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. 
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years earlier, its impending arrival significantly increased the competition over maritime 
rights in the South China Sea.  By submitting claims to the commission, many regional 
states formally expanded the exclusive maritime jurisdiction that they claimed beyond a 
200 nautical mile EEZ from their coastlines, thereby increasing the intensity of 
competition over maritime rights.  Previously, these states had either not stated that they 
would claim extended continental shelf rights or had not clearly delineated the size of the 
continental shelf that they claimed.  In addition, in the letters submitted to the CLCS, 
states not only contested each other’s claims to maritime rights but also their claims to 
territorial sovereignty over Paracel and the Spratly Islands.  Finally, China’s first 
diplomatic letter challenging Vietnam and Malaysia’s submissions included a map of the 
region that depicted the Paracel and Spratly Islands along with the now infamous nine-
dashed line.26  Although the Chinese note did not mention the line, Vietnam and other 
claimants viewed the map as an expansion of China’s claims.   
In the eyes of other claimants, Chinese actions reinforced the view that China 
seeks control over the entire South China Sea.  In 2009, China detained over 400 
Vietnamese fishermen who had ventured into the waters around the Paracel Islands, 
which China controls.  In 2011, China harassed seismic survey vessels contracted by 
Vietnam and by the Philippines.  In one incident, a ship from the China Marine 
Surveillance force, a maritime law enforcement agency under the State Oceanic 
Administration, severed the towed sonar cable on a Vietnamese-contracted seismic 
survey vessel operating roughly 100 miles from the Vietnamese coast.27 In 2012, the 
China National Offshore Oil invited foreign oil companies to bid on exploration blocks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf 
27 Fravel, "China's Strategy in the South China Sea," p. 306. 
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that overlapped with existing Vietnamese blocks within the 200 nautical mile EEZ from 
its coast.28 
In April 2012, China’s approach became more pronounced.  In early April, a 
Philippine naval ship was dispatched to investigate reports of fishing boats inside 
Scarborough Shoal, a coral reef approximately 135 miles from the Philippines and 543 
miles from China.  Although Philippine personnel searched the boats, which were 
harvesting giant clams and other marine animals in violation of Philippine law, two patrol 
ships from the China Marine Surveillance force under the State Oceanic Administration 
arrived on the scene and blocked the entrance to the shoal, thus preventing the arrest of 
the fishermen.29  A standoff ensued, as both sides used government ships to demonstrate 
their sovereignty over the shoal and jurisdiction over the adjacent waters.  When the 
standoff ended in mid June 2012, China had achieved effective control over the shoal and 
adjacent waters.  In addition to blocking access to the shoal, China also tried to coerce the 
Philippines by quarantining imported bananas, a Philippine key export, and halting 
Chinese tour groups. 
Although China’s engagement with ASEAN has been on hallmark of its regional 
diplomacy in the 2000s, China’s active defense of its territorial claims has damaged 
China’s ties with this organization and the region more generally.  In keeping with its 
goal of pursuing bilateral and not multilateral talks over the territorial and maritime 
jurisdiction disputes, China has tried (and mostly failed) to keep the South China Sea and 
the broader issue of maritime security from the agenda of meetings of the ASEAN 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 M. Taylor Fravel, "The South China Sea Oil Card," The Diplomat, June 27, 2012, 
http://thediplomat.com/china-power/the-south-china-sea-oil-card/ 
29 The vessels from the China Marine Surveillance have been incorporated into the newly established China 
Coast Guard, which is under the jurisdiction of the State Oceanic Administration. 
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Regional Forum (ARF) and from the East Asian Summit (EAS).  In 2010, more than half 
of the members of the ARF, including most of the claimants in the South China Sea, 
publicly expressed concern about the disputes, breaking many years of silence on the 
issue in the forum.  In response, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi responded harshly, stating 
at one point “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is 
just a fact.”30  In July 2012, China used its influence over Cambodia, then holding the 
ASEAN chair, to references to specific disputes in the South China Sea from being 
included in an ASEAN joint communiqué.  When agreement could not be reached about 
how to characterize the disputes in the South China Sea, Cambodia exercised its power 
has chair and decided that for the first time in forty-five years no communiqué would be 
issued.31  In other words, China’s meddling posed a threat to ASEAN unity as a whole.  
Finally, during a China-ASEAN meeting in October 2012, Vice Foreign Minister Fu 
Ying chastised ASEAN states for “internationalizing” the dispute by raising the issue 
with non-claimant states.  Fu also outlined how China expected these states to behave in 
the future: that there should not multilateral talks, no discussion with other major powers 
like the United States, no media interviews to bring publicity to the dispute and no action 
at the United Nations.32  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Quoted in Geoff Dyer, “Beijing’s Elevated Aspirations,” Financial Times, 10 November 2010.  For 
Yang’s official statement, see “Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Refutes Fallacies On the South China Sea 
Issue,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, 26 July 2010. 
31 “ASEAN Talks Fail Over China Dispute,” AFP, July 13, 2012, http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-
filipino/world/07/13/12/southeast-asian-summit-breaks-acrimony; Ian Storey, “China Pushes on the South 
China Sea, ASEAN Unity Collapses,” China Brief Vol. 12, No. 15 
32 Greg Torode, “China ‘Dictatorial’ In Scarborough Shoal Disputes, Says Albert Del Rosario,” South 
China Morning Post, November 30, 2012 
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Regional Responses 
 
From the perspective of China’s regional diplomacy from the mid-1990s to the 
mid-2000s, China’s hard-nosed actions in the South China Sea have been 
counterproductive, worsening ties with its neighbors.  First, China’s image has been 
harmed by what a Philippine official described as its “dictatorial” approach in the South 
China Sea.  In the Philippines, a public opinion survey taken in May 2012 during the 
Scarborough standoff indicated that “net trust” in China had dropped by forty-six percent, 
to negative thirty-six percent.33   Following the cable cutting in incident in May 2011, 
Vietnamese held anti-Chinese protests over the South China Sea for 12 weeks until 
finally halted by the government.  Even Singapore, normally a state China counts as a 
friend in the region, publicly called on China in 2011 to clarify its claims in the South 
China Sea because of its concern about growing tensions in the region.34  Indonesia, a 
state reluctant to openly confront China diplomatically, submitted a note verbale to the 
United Nations to protest the behavior of Chinese ships in Indonesian waters.35  As 
discussed in the following section, Vietnam and the Philippines have also taken steps to 
improve maritime cooperation with Japan. 
Second, regional states have engaged in external balancing by seeking to improve 
security ties with other states, especially the United States.  Perhaps the most noteworthy 
has been the improvement in Vietnamese-United States relations. In the past few years, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Social Weather Stations, “Second Quarter 2012 Social Weather Survey,” 13 August 2012, 
http://www.sws.org.ph/pr20120813.htm 
34 “MFA Spokesman's Comments In Responses To Media Queries On The Visit Of Chinese Maritime 
Surveillance Vessel Haixun 31 To Singapore,” 20 June 2011, 
http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2011/201106/press_20110620.html 
35  For Indonesia’s letter to China, see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf 
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the two countries have been moving towards the formal establishment of a “strategic 
partnership.”  Defense ties have blossomed, to include annual port calls, exercises and, in 
2011, an MOU for advancing bilateral defense cooperation.36  Similarly, the United 
States and the Philippines further deepened their security relations.  In November 2011, 
the two countries signed the Manila Declaration to re-affirm the alliance on its 60th 
anniversary.37  In April 2012, the two countries held for a “2+2” ministerial including 
foreign affairs and defense chiefs for the first time.  The meeting outlined a series of 
strategic objectives and included a detailed action plan, parts of which focused on 
maritime security (including strengthening its maritime security capabilities and maritime 
domain awareness).38   
Regional states have also engaged India and Japan (discussed in the next section).  
Again, Vietnam has been the most active in this regard.  As India has invested in 
Vietnam’s offshore oil and gas fields, it is a natural partner for Hanoi.  Although India 
announced its “look east” policy in the early 1990s, military and maritime cooperation 
with Vietnam has increased in the last five years.  In addition to dialogues and exchanges, 
the two countries now conduct joint military exercises.  In June 2013, for example, four 
Indian navy ships visited Vietnam and conducted joint exercises with the Vietnamese 
navy in the South China Sea.39 
Third, states in the region have also begun to increase their spending on defense 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 William Jordan, Lewis M. Stern and Walter Lohman, U.S.–Vietnam Defense Relations: Investing in 
Strategic Alignment, (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2012). 
37 “Manila Declaration on U.S.-Philippine Alliance,” November 16, 2011, 
http://translations.state.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/11/20111116141458su0.2878338.html 
38 “Joint Statement of the United States-Philippines Ministerial Dialogue,” April 30, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188977.htm 
39 “Indian Navy To Hold Rescue Drill In Da Nang,” VietnamNet, 5 June 2013, 
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/75969/indian-navy-to-hold-rescue-drill-in-da-nang.html 
 	   18 
to enhance their own maritime capabilities, or internal balancing.   Vietnam has been the 
most active in this regard.  In addition to increasing its defense budget from roughly 2 
percent of GDP in 2004 to 2.5 percent of in 2010.40  Vietnam has also purchased 
advanced equipment, primarily from Russia, including 20 Su-30MMK Flanker fighter 
aircraft, 6 Kilo-class submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles and four Gepard-class 
frigates also armed with advanced Russian anti-ship missiles.41 
 
The East China Sea 
 
In the East China Sea, China’s pursuit and defense of its maritime claims has 
worsened ties with Japan.  China’s behavior has created opportunities for the United 
States to strengthen its alliance with Japan and sparked efforts by Japan to enhance its 
own military capabilities.     
 
Background 
 
Management of China’s claims in the East China Sea have posed similar 
problems for China’s relations with a key neighbor in Northeast Asia, Japan.  China and 
Japan contest the sovereignty of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.  They also disagree about 
where to delimit maritime jurisdiction in the East China Sea, primarily in waters north of 
the disputed islands.  Japan maintains that a median line should be drawn between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/ 
41 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 
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coasts of the two states, while China claims that its maritime jurisdiction extends beyond 
200nm to where its continental shelf ends at the Okinawa trough. 
 
Growing Tensions 
 
Tensions over the both disputes simmered on a low boil during the mid-2000s.  At 
the time, the China National Offshore Oil Company was developing a series of gas fields 
in the Xihu Trough.  Wells for one of the fields were drilled only several miles away 
from the median line claimed by Japan, prompting concerns in Japan that China would 
siphon natural resources that Japan claimed as its own.  To address these concerns, the 
two countries reached an informal agreement on natural gas development in the East 
China Sea in June 2008.42  In December 2008, however, two vessels from the China 
Marine Surveillance force crossed into the territorial waters around the islands in an 
apparent bid to scuttle the gas field agreement.  This marked the first time that Chinese 
government ships had entered what Japan views as its sovereign territorial waters around 
the islands. 
The situation deteriorated in September 2010, when a Chinese fishing vessel 
entered the territorial waters around the islands and rammed Japanese Coast Guard 
vessels to evade capture.  After the boat and crew were detained, Japan decided to indict 
the captain for violating a number of domestic laws.  China objected to this move, which 
was seen as an exercise of Japan’s sovereignty over the islands and an escalation of the 
dispute.  Over the following two weeks, China’s reaction was harsh.  The Ministry of 	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Foreign Affairs in Beijing summoned the Japanese ambassador multiple times, often in 
the middle of the night.  Official delegations and visits to Japan were postponed.  While 
in New York for a meeting at the United Nations, Premier Wen Jiabao offered strong and 
pointed remarks against Japan, stating that China would take “further measures” and 
Japan would bear “all the responsibility for consequences” if the captain was not released 
immediately and unconditionally.43  Finally, the shipment of rare earth metals used to 
manufacture a variety of electronics to Japan was postponed, indicating that China would 
punish Japan economically until the captain was released.44   
After the September 2010 incident, China increased the presence of its civilian 
maritime law enforcement agencies in the waters around the islands.  Vessels from the 
Bureau of Fisheries Administration sailed to the islands approximately once a month.  
Most of the time, they loitered in waters beyond Japan’s 12 nautical mile territorial 
waters around the islands.  On three occasions, however, Chinese government ships did 
enter into these waters: August 2011 (two vessels from the Bureau of Fisheries 
Administration), March 2012 (one CMS vessel) and July 2012 (three vessels from the 
Bureau of Fisheries Administration). 
China’s harsh reaction to the detention of the fishing captain and the increased 
presence of Chinese government ships near the disputed islands had two negative 
consequences. First, it worsened China’s image in Japan. According to an annual survey 
conducted by the Japanese government, the percentage of respondents who reported 
feeling an affinity toward China dropped from 38.5 percent in 2009 to 20 percent in 	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2010.45  Second, events in the East China Sea underscored the value of the alliance with 
the United States to Japanese who had been questioning its utility.  In the late 2000s, 
Japanese politicians had called on the United States to re-affirm publicly that Article 5 of 
the defense treaty covered the islands.  In October 2010, Hillary Clinton became the first 
secretary of state in several decades to publicly re-affirm the U.S. commitment.46  
In April 2012, the conservative governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, launched a 
public campaign to purchase three of the disputed islands owned by a private Japanese 
citizen.  Ishihara claimed that the central government was not doing enough to protect the 
islands, an argument which resonated easily because of the increased presence of Chinese 
government ships near the islands after the 2010 ramming incident.  After millions of 
dollars were raised, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda faced a tough decision: whether to 
let the islands fall into the hands of an unpredictable and nationalist politician or by the 
islands to control their use and development.  Noda announced his decision to purchase 
the islands on July 7, 2012, which, unfortunately, was the anniversary of the 1937 Marco 
Polo Bridge incident that commemorates Japan’s bid to conquer China in World War II.  
Even though Noda argued that central government ownership would be stabilizing, China 
opposed the move, which was seen as not only an exercise of the sovereignty over the 
islands but also as strengthening Japan’s claim by bringing more of the islands under the 
direct control of the Japanese government. 
In early September, the sale of the islands was completed.  China reacted with 
even greater vigor than in 2010 to register its opposition and to demonstrate that it 	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contested Japan’s sovereignty over the islands.  First, China issued a government 
statement announcing the drawing of baselines for demarcating territorial waters around 
the islands, a legal act that affirmed its claim.  Second, China began to dispatch patrols of 
China Marine Surveillance vessels within 12 nautical miles of the islands, an act 
undertaken to challenge   Japan’s sovereignty and administrative control not just on maps 
but also on the water.  Between September 2012 and December 2013, Chinese vessels 
have entered the territorial waters around the islands seventy-four times and maintained a 
near continuous presence in the contiguous zone just beyond the territorial waters.47  
Third, anti-Japanese protests were permitted to occur for several days throughout the 
country.  These were probably the largest anti-foreign protests since 1989, with 
demonstrations reportedly in eighty-five cities.48  Fourth, foreign ministry officials began 
to use increasingly harsh language.  At one point, a senior member of the ministry 
described Japan’s purchase of the three islands “like an atomic bomb dropped on 
China.”49  Fifth, during the protests, some Japanese factories and companies were 
vandalized.  Moreover, sales of Japanese cars in Japan (which protestors had targeted) 
plummeted by more than 50 percent.50 
 
Japan Responds 
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China’s actions in the East China Sea have been counterproductive, harming ties 
with a key neighbor.  First, as mentioned above, China’s actions harmed its image in 
Japanese eyes.  Although affinity for China improved in 2011 to 26.3 percent, it 
plummeted to the lowest level in several decades, 18 percent.51  As slogans used by the 
Chinese protestors called for the annihilation of Japan (jianmie riben), such low levels of 
affinity are understandable.  Nevertheless, Chinese leaders have sought to maintain a 
stable, non-hostile relationship with Japan, a position that is now untenable.  At the same 
time, Japanese affinity for the United States rose to 84.5 percent, the highest levels on 
record, up from 78.9 percent in 2009.52   
Second, Japan has engaged in external balancing against China in two ways.  To 
start, Japan has moved to further strengthen its alliance with the United States.  Towards 
this end, on several occasions in 2010 and 2012, Japan sought and received public and 
high-level affirmations from American officials that Article 5 of the US-Japan Mutual 
Defense Treaty covered the islands.  In addition, the islands appear to be playing a 
greater role in defense planning.  In January 2013, working level talks on revising the 
U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, the operational core of the alliance, began in response to 
China’s increased activities in the East China Sea.53 In March 2013, the United States and 
Japan updated plans to defend the islands from attack.54  In June 2013, the two countries 
held unprecedented amphibious exercises, “Dawn Blitz,” off the coast of California. 
In addition, Japan has strengthened ties with other states in an effort to balance 
China’s growing maritime capabilities.  In June 2012, Japan and India held their first 	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bilateral naval exercise in waters near Tokyo.55  In January 2013, Japan and India held 
their first maritime affairs dialogue, which included diplomatic and military officials.  
Japan has also engaged the Philippines, holding maritime dialogues in 2011 and 2013.56  
Japan has also agreed to donate 10 patrol boats to the Philippine Coast Guard in order to 
strengthen its maritime capacity.  In June 2013, Tokyo pledged even greater support for 
Manila.  Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera stated that the two countries 
“agreed that we will further co-operate in terms of the defense of remote islands.”57  
Finally, in April 2013, Japan and Vietnam announced that they would hold maritime 
security talks in May 2013 focused on China’s assertiveness and Japan’s possible support 
for strengthening Vietnam’s maritime capacity.58  
Third, Japan has also engaged in limited internal balancing.  The new Abe 
government, elected December 2012, pledged to increase Japan’s defense budget for the 
first time in eleven years.  In December 2013, Japan announced that defense spending 
would increase by 2.2 percent in the 2014 fiscal year, the largest increase in two 
decades.59  The Maritime Self Defense Forces has moved to expand the size of its 
submarine fleet by extending the service life of existing boats and building new Soryu-
class submarines and new destroyers.  The Ground Self Defense Forces have also sought 
to bolster its presence in the southern tip of the Ryukyus, on Yonaguni Island and may 
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create a new amphibious force to focus on seizing and controlling islands.60     
 
 
China’s Response to Its Regional Challenge 
 
Whether China has formulated a response to the worsening of ties with its 
neighbors remains unclear.  Several trends in Chinese policy can be identified, but none 
appears as if they will be able to reverse the decline in bilateral relations with many of its 
maritime neighbors. 
First, especially in the South China Sea, China has sought — at times — to 
moderate how it defends its claims.  The first phase of moderation occurred from roughly 
mid 2011 until the standoff over Scarborough Shoal in April 2012.  First, in the summer 
of 2011, China’s top leaders, including President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, re-
affirmed the late Deng Xiaoping’s guiding principle for dealing with China’s maritime 
conflicts of “setting aside disputes and pursuing common development.”  Second, China 
reached agreements with other claimant states with the aim of managing tensions, 
promoting dialogue, and facilitating eventual dispute resolution.  In addition to a July 
2011 agreement with ASEAN on guidelines for implementing the code of conduct 
declaration, China reached a much more substantial agreement with Vietnam in October 
2011 over basic principles for resolving maritime disputes that stress using international 
law. Third, China’s top leaders have held high-level meetings with their counterparts to 
improve broader bilateral relationships.  Philippine President Benigno Acquino and 	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Vietnamese communist party general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited Beijing in 
August and October 2011, respectively.  Likewise, Vice President Xi Jinping traveled to 
Vietnam in December 2011 as part of a Southeast Asian tour. Fourth, authoritative 
Chinese-language media such as the People’s Daily in mid-2011 began to underscore the 
importance of a cooperative approach in the South China Sea.  Such articles are written 
largely to explain policy decisions to domestic readers, especially those working within 
party and state bureaucracies. Fifth, China engaged other claimants by establishing a 3B 
yuan (476 million US dollar) China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund (November 
2011), hosting several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the 
South China Sea (December 2011), and hosting a meeting with senior ASEAN officials 
to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration (January 2012).  Finally, 
China halted the more assertive behavior that attracted so much adverse attention 
between 2009 and 2011.  Vessels from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration have 
detained and held only two Vietnamese fishing vessels since late 2010 (with the last 
detention occurring in March 2012).61  Patrol ships from China Marine Surveillance (or 
the newly established China Coast Guard) have not interfered in Vietnamese or 
Philippine hydrocarbon exploration activities since May 2011.  More generally, China 
has not obstructed related exploration activities, such as Exxon’s successful drilling of an 
exploratory well in Vietnamese waters claimed by China in October 2011. 62 
After the standoff at Scarborough Shoal, however, China returned to a more 
assertive approach.  In addition to acquiring effective control over the reef and 
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surrounding waters, China adopted other unilateral actions designed to strengthen its 
position in the South China Sea.  Most importantly, China announced in June 2012 that 
the administrative status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands would be upgraded from a 
county-level office to one of three prefectural-level cities (dishiji) in Hainan Province.  In 
July 2012, as discussed above, China used its influence over Cambodia to prevent 
Vietnam and the Philippines from inserting references to their specific disputes with 
China in the ASEAN joint communiqué. 
By the end of 2013, China appears to have begun another period of moderation in 
the South China Sea.  In April 2013, China announced that it wanted to re-start stalled 
talks with ASEAN over a binding code of conduct.63 In June 2013, China and ASEAN 
announced that “consultations” on a code of conduct would be held in September.64  
Talks were held in September, as planned, and further talks have been scheduled for 
Spring 2014.65  Earlier, China had avoided such talks, stating “conditions were not ripe.”  
At the same time, China has sought to pursue a more balanced approach with Vietnam.  
In early June 2013, defense ministries in each country agreed to establish a hotline 
between their navies.66  In mid June, during President Sang’s visit to China, Vietnam and 
China agreed to establish a hotline between fisheries departments in addition to resuming 
talks on the demarcation of the mouth of the Tonkin (Beibu) Gulf and pursuing a political 
settlement in the South China Sea.67  In October 2013, Vietnam and China established a 
joint working group to explore development projects in disputed waters and the group 	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held its first meeting in January 2014.68  
Consistent with a return to moderation in the South China Sea, China’s top 
leaders have signaled the importance of improving ties with Southeast Asia and limiting 
the potential for the territorial and maritime claims to harm ties with these countries.  
During a meeting on maritime affairs at the end of July 2013, Xi Jinping signaled that 
China might pursue a more moderate approach.  Xi affirmed Deng Xiaoping’s guidance 
for managing offshore island disputes of “setting aside disputes and pursuing joint 
development” while also underscoring the need to coordinate “rights defense” in the 
maritime domain with the maintenance of stability.69  In September and October 2013, Xi 
Jinping and Li Keqiang both conducted tours of the region before attending APEC and 
the EAS, respectively. Taken together, they visited half of the members of ASEAN and 
four of the five claimants in the South China Sea: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Vietnam and Brunei.  During these bilateral visits and at the APEC and EAS meetings, 
China sought to deepen relations with the region that had been harmed by the escalation 
of these disputes.  Finally, in October, China’s top leaders held an unprecedented meeting 
on regional diplomacy, which was attended by all seven members of the Politburo 
Standing Committee and lasted for two days.70  The main theme of the speech was the 
importance of “maintaining a stable external environment,” which, by implication had 
been harmed by disputes that had arisen with many neighbors.  Notwithstanding new 
fishing rules issued by the Hainan’s legislature, China appears poised as of this writing to 
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maintain stability and prevent the further escalation of tension in the South China Sea.71 
Nevertheless, both periods of moderation in the South China Sea have focused on 
managing how China pursues its claims and not efforts to settle or resolve the underlying 
disputes.  As a result, tactical pauses that increase stability are possible, but other states in 
these disputes will likely remain fearful of Chinese intentions, unless actions are taken by 
which China might “tie its hands” by, for example, offering clear but limited definition of 
the nine-dashed line.  Otherwise, these states will continue to have strong incentives to 
strengthen their security ties with the United States, thus undermining a key objective in 
China’s regional policy. 
In the East China Sea, China has not adopted a more moderate approach toward 
Japan since September 2012.  The most that could be said is that China has moderated the 
frequency of patrols within the territorial waters of the disputed Senkaku Islands.  As 
demonstrated in Figure 1, Chinese government ships have entered the territorial waters 
around the islands between three and eight times per month.  Nevertheless, the situation 
remains deadlocked, as Japan refuses to accede to China’s demand that Tokyo 
acknowledge the presence of a dispute over the islands.  As a result, the situation remains 
brittle and prone to spikes in tension.  In October 2013, for example, Japan stated that it 
would shoot unidentified drones over the islands following the flight of a Chinese drone 
in September roughly 100 kilometers north of the island.  In November 2013, perhaps in 
response to Japan’s stance on drones as well as a desire to increase pressure on Japan, 
China announced the establishment of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone 
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in November 2013.  The People’s Daily described the difference between the East China 
Sea and South China Sea as “tension in the east, stability in the south” (dongjin 
nanwen).72 
Figure 1 
 
Second, China has tried to prevent the maritime disputes from harming overall 
relations with other countries.  Although China has pursued this approach in the past in 
many disputes, including with India today, it has nevertheless become more challenging 
under the shadow of growing Chinese military capabilities and especially naval power.  
China perhaps has been most successful with Vietnam, where exchanges and interactions 	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between the two communist parties have continued at a rapid pace and at high levels 
despite the presence of these disputes.  As discussed above, Vietnamese President Sang’s 
June 2013 trip to Beijing reflected a concerted effort to prevent the various maritime 
disputes between China and Vietnam from affecting overall political relations.  Likewise, 
to commemorate two decades of engagement with ASEAN, China in November 2012 
launched a campaign to underscore the importance of the China-ASEAN relationship, 
which was designed to demonstrate to all states in the region how they have — and can 
— gain from China’s rise, while also hinting at what they might lose if they continue to 
counter China.  Whether efforts to separate economics from politics are successful, 
however, would depend on the degree to which China asserts and defends its claims in 
maritime disputes.  Given the disparity in power between China and most ASEAN states 
and the asymmetric economic relationships, however, such arguments may fall on deaf 
ears.  
The situation with Japan in the East China Sea is more difficult to assess.  
According to recent analysis, the Chinese-Japanese economic relationship has remained 
robust since the purchase of the islands in September 2012 and that trade has effectively 
been delinked from politics.73  Nevertheless, following Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the 
Yasukuni shrine in December 2013, China may decide to increase economic pressure on 
Japan as well.  As of this writing (January 2014), it remains too soon to tell. 
Third, since early 2012, China has embarked on an effort to strengthen ties with 
the United States.  A turning point may have occurred in February 2012, when then Vice 
President Xi Jinping called on the US and China to develop a “new type of great power 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Richard Katz, “Why Chinese-Japanese Economic Relations Are Improving 
Delinking Trade From Politics,” Foreign Affairs, December 30, 2013 
 	   32 
relationship,” a slogan that has since gathered steam over the following year.74  The most 
important driver is arguably the policy of rebalancing to Asia that senior U.S. officials 
and President Obama articulated in 2011.  Nevertheless, improved ties with the United 
States would aid China’s regional policy by raising the costs for the United States of 
increasing its support for those states in maritime disputes with China (lest future ties 
with China be harmed) and reducing the potential of a counter-balancing coalition 
forming over maritime issues or perhaps more broadly.  In this way, China seeks to drive 
a wedge between the United States and those states in the region with which it has direct 
maritime conflicts.  Regional states may also be deterred by improved U.S.-China ties 
from seeking further security assistance from the United States.   
Whether any of these efforts will be successful and allow China to repair frayed 
ties with its neighbors remains uncertain.  Despite the periods of moderation discussed 
above, it remains unclear whether China recognizes that its policies have backfired, 
reducing its security and not improving it.  Although territorial disputes are inherently 
interactive, and China has been at times reacting to the actions of others, China’s public 
rhetoric places all blame on opposing states.  States in disputes with China are blamed for 
their provocations, while the United States is blamed for encouraging these states to resist 
China with provocative acts.  Such rhetoric may not reflect the private views of Chinese 
policymakers.  If such rhetoric does, however, it indicates what Luttwak describes as 
“great power autism” and low odds of China taking the steps needed to re-assure states in 
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the region and decrease the value of strong ties with the United States.75  If China does 
not acknowledge that its policies have backfired, then relations with neighboring states 
will only continue to deteriorate. 
In addition, the moment for China to re-assure its neighbors over maritime claims 
may have passed.  The past few years of have witnessed impressive displays of China’s 
growing maritime capabilities.  In 2005 and 2006, Chinese government ships from the 
China Marine Surveillance Force began regular patrols in China’s claimed EEZ.76  In 
2008, the People’s Liberation Army Navy began long-distance training exercises in the 
East and South China Seas, exercises whose frequency and scope only continue to 
increase.77   China’s navy now regularly conducts long-distance exercises in the Western 
Pacific, which require that PLAN vessels transit through the Japanese homelands.  
Although such actions are consistent with international norms, they underscore the 
change in Chinese capabilities that is occurring in the region.  Under these conditions, 
and given China’s assertive actions, uncertainty about China’s intentions are likely to 
linger for a long time to come.  Because these states have other interests at stake with 
China, especially in the economic realm, the opportunity for improved ties despite the 
presence of these disputes remains.  Nevertheless, it requires a sustained engagement by 
Beijing and a tacit agreement by all claimants to decrease the assertion of their claims.  In 
recent years, the episodes of moderation have been fleeting. 
Why Chinas has been unable to do more to prevent any further deterioration of 
ties with its maritime neighbors begs an important question.  The intensification of 
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China’s maritime disputes occurred during a once-in-a-decade leadership transition in 
which the majority of leaders on the Politburo were replaced.  As a result, Chinese 
leaders face strong domestic incentives not to appear weak in their interactions with other 
states, especially in disputes concerning sovereignty.  Relatedly, Chinese leaders may 
believe that it is important to stand firm when faced with what they view as challenges to 
China’s claims, especially during this period of political transition.78  In the case of 
Japan, historical memory further increases the need to be seen as not making concessions, 
especially when sovereignty is at stake. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
China’s relations with its immediate neighbors play a central in China’s foreign 
policy.  Good relations with neighbors enhance China’s autonomy, while poor relations 
can restrict China’s freedom of maneuver by increasing the influence of major powers in 
China’s neighborhood.  From the mid-2000s, and especially from 2010, the 
intensification of maritime disputes in East Asia involving China has raised serious 
questions about China’s position in the region.  Intensification of these disputes create 
strong incentives for states opposing China to balance externally by seeking the support 
of other states (especially the United States) and to balance internally by increasing their 
own naval capabilities.  Regional states seek to balance against China not just because of 
the immediate conflicts over territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction but also 	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because of fears about how a stronger China will behave in the region in the future. 
To date, China’s active defense of its claims in maritime disputes in the East 
China Sea and the South China Sea have harmed ties with opposing states and increased 
the attractiveness of the United States for others in the region.  The poses a clear 
challenge to China’s foreign policy, which from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s sought 
to improve ties with all of its neighbors, to create space for China’s development and to 
limit the role of major powers in the region.  If current trends persist, and tensions in 
existing territorial dispute continue to spiral upwards, worsening ties with neighboring 
states will increase the value of strong U.S. presence for others in the region and for 
states to work together to balance against China in the maritime domain.  Over time, this 
could accelerate polarization of the region and create a much more competitive 
environment that ultimately harm Chinese interests more than it advances them.  As the 
more powerful state in these disputes, proactive action by China is needed to restore 
stability. 
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